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Due to the increasingly intense global competition and the corresponding search for sources of 
sustained  competitive  advantage  during  the  last  thirty  years,  the  interest  in  strategic 
management has risen, both among academics and practitioners. This evolution resulted in 
various  organisational functions  becoming more  concerned with their role in the  strategic 
management process. The Human Resource Management field has similarly sought to become 
integrated  into  this  process  through  the  development  of a  new  discipline  referred  to  as 
Strategic Human Resource Management. One of the central issues that has been studied in the 
field of SHRM is theHRM-performance relationship. Despite the pile of studies on this topic, 
it has been criticised for its lack of a strong theoretical foundation. 
The purpose of this  literature review is  to  make  a journey of exploration through  the 
(S)HRM-performance literature and to map out the different theories that can be useful in 
understanding  and explaining the  complex  relationship  between  these  two  variables.  This 
'theory mapping' should enable us  to decide upon the presence or absence of theory within 
this research field. 
Our main conclusion is that this  field does  not suffer from a lack of theories.  On the 
contrary,  the  existing  theories  include  economical,  sociological  as  well  as  psychological 
perspectives and all together they shed some light on how HRM might be determined and how 
the mechanisms within the black box might work. Moreover, conditions are proposed under 
which HRM can lead to higher performance. The real problems researchers are coping with 
can be summarised as follows: (1) the difficulties the (combination of) present theories impose 
on empirical research, (2) a lack of theory building with regard to the concepts of HRM and 
performance and their measurement and (3) the constant theoretical reorientation because of 
the ever returning criticism. HRM and performance - Research without theory? 
Introduction 
Due to the increasingly intense global competition and the corresponding search for sources of 
sustained  competitive  advantage  during  the  last  thirty  years,  the  interest  in  strategic 
management  has  risen,  both  among  academics  and  practitioners.  Dyer &  Reeves  (1995) 
describe this evolution as follows:  'Global competition emerged in a major way in the 1970s, 
intensified in the 1980s and has become 'a way of life' in the 1990s. At first competition was 
based on price. With time, the focus shifted to quality. Currently, globally competitive prices 
and quality are, for many companies around the world, simply baseline. The real competitive 
action these days focuses on customised products, service, speed and innovation'. As capital 
and technology became available to almost everyone everywhere, the search for sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage increasingly pointed towards a firm's internal strengths and 
opportunities (Barney,  1991). This focus on organisational capability has resulted in various 
organisational functions becoming more concerned with their role in the strategic management 
process.  The Human Resource Management (HRM) field has  similarly  sought  to  become 
integrated  into  this  process  through  the  development  of a  new  discipline  referred  to  as 
Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) (Wright & McMahan, 1992). The popularity 
of SHRM has increased over time thanks to the explicit promise of greater organisational 
effectiveness  achievable  through  the  development of a  well  balanced HRM and  a  highly 
skilled human capital pool (Delery & Shaw, ed. 2001; Fombrun, Tichy & Devanna, 1984). 
Despite this rising interest, the SHRM field has been criticised during the late eighties and 
early nineties for its lack of a strong theoretical foundation (Dyer, 1985; Mahoney & Deckop, 
1986; Bacharach, 1989; Butler & aI., 1991; Ferris & Judge, 1991). In an attempt to refute this 
criticism, Wright &  McMahan  (1992)  developed a definition  of the  SHRM construct  and 
discussed six theoretical models relevant to the research field. One of the central issues in their 
framework and in the SHRM field is the link between HR practices and firm-level outcomes. 
The relationship between both variables has been subject to a huge body of empirical studies. 
Theories have been developed in three main areas concerning HRM and performance: (1) the 
concept (and measurement) of HR practices and HR systems appropriate to study the link with 
performance,  (2)  the concept (and measurement) of performance and (3)  the nature of the 
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linkage between the two variables (Truss, 2001). Despite this theory development, three of the 
most cited criticisms  with  regard  to  the  empirical  studies  are:  (1)  the  lack of a  universal 
performance concept  (and measures),  (2)  the lack of consistency in  defining  the  so-called 
'High Performance Work Practices/Systems' and (3) the uncertainty about the precise nature 
of the linkage between HRM and performance (Guest,  1997; Delery &  Doty, 1996; Dyer & 
Reeves, 1995). With regard to this last remark, Ulrich (1997) stated that early attempts to link 
HRM with organisational performance relied on the common-sense belief that improving the 
way people are  managed inevitably leads to enhanced firm performance, without seeking to 
justify  this  linkage  in  theoretical  terms.  Until  now,  the  need  for  theory  refinement  is 
pronounced  (Guest,  2001;  Ramsay,  2000).  This is  the  point  where  Wright  and  McMahan 
(1992) come in. Empirical work based upon the theories proposed by these authors should be 
able to answer this  'theoretical gap'. The question presents itself whether it is a matter of 'no 
theory', 'old theory' or 'good theory, bad research'. 
The purpose of this literature review is to map out the different theories that can be useful 
in understanding and explaining the complex relationship between HRM and organisational 
performance. Therefore, we will use the framework of Wright & McMahan (1992) and extend 
it with other relevant theories.  This  'theory mapping'  should enable us  to decide upon  the 
presence or absence of theory within this research field. 
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Theoretical frameworks for studying SHRM 
Our point of departure  is  a framework to  study  SHRM proposed by Wright  & McMahan 
(1992). The authors define SHRM as  'the pattern o/planned human resource deployments and 
activities intended to enable an organisation to achieve its goals'. Whereas HRM used to have 
a rather administrative function until the late seventies, the emphasis in this definition is on its 
(strategic) role in achieving broader organisational objectives and on the introduction of well-
considered combinations of HR practices, both in terms of internal and external fit (cf. infra). 
With this definition in  mind, Wright & McMahan (1992) state that SHRM theory should be 
concerned with  (1)  the  determinants  of decisions  about  human resource  practices,  (2)  the 
composition  of the  human  resource  capital  pool,  (3)  the  specification  of required  human 
resource  behaviours  and  (4)  the  effectiveness  of these  decisions  given  various  business 
strategies and/or competitive situations. This macro-organisational approachi  to  viewing the 
role and function of HRM in the larger organisation is modelled in Figure 1. 
Firm Strategy 
(  I ) Resource- HRM Practices 
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the Firm 
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Figure 1  Theoretical frameworks for studying Strategic Human Resource Management (Wright 
& McMahan, 1992) 
The authors examine six theoretical models that shed some light on the determinants of HR 
practices and/or the HRM-performance relationship. According to them, these theories can be 
grouped as follows: (1) the resource-based view of the firm, (2) the behavioural approach, (3) 
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the cybernatic systems  perspective and (4)  the  agency/transaction cost theory consider firm 
strategy as the main determinant of HR practices. Non-strategic forces on the other hand are 
covered by (5) the resource dependence approach and (6) institutional theory. In institutional 
theory,  one cannot talk about SHRM in  the narrow sense of the word because both political 
and institutional forces determine the introduction of particular HR practices. Although these 
forces are not necessarily inconsistent with broader strategy, they are usually not the products 
of a rational decision-making process. 
In  what  follows,  we  map  out  the  basic  principles  of these  theories.  Throughout  the 
discussion we will extend the framework with other perspectives and theories contributing to a 
better understanding  of the  link between  (S)HRM  and performance.  This  overview  is  not 
chronological,  nor  is  it  exhaustive.  We  describe  the  different  steps  of  the  (S)HRM  -
performance relationship in a logical sequence and only mention the theoretical aspects insofar 
they are  relevant to  our research field.  It is  our purpose to describe the relevance of these 
theories to the HRM-performance discussion and to make a comparison between the different 
approaches. 
Resource-based view of the firm: looking inside for competitive advantage 
Understanding sources of sustained competitive advantage for firms has become a major area 
of research  in  the  field  of strategic  management.  Since  the  1960's  a  single  framework, 
traditionally known as SWOT analysis, has been dominantly present in this research area. This 
model  suggests  that  firms  using  their  internal  strengths  in  exploiting  environmental 
opportunities and neutralising external threats, while avoiding internal weaknesses, are more 
likely to  gain competitive advantage then other firms  (Barney,  1995). Until the 1990's most 
work has tended to  focus  primarily on  analysing a firm's external opportunities and threats 
and has  attempted to  describe  the  environmental conditions that favour high  levels  of firm 
performance  (e.g.  the  'five forces  model'  of Porter,  1980,  1985).  During  the  1990's  the 
resource-based  view  (RBV)  entered  as  a  major  player  into  the  theoretical  discussion  of 
strategic  management  (Barney,  1991,  1995;  Conner,  1991;  Peteraf,  1993).  This  theory 
emphasises the link between internal resources of the firmii,  its strategy and its performance. 
According to Barney (1991), firm resources fall into three categories: (1) physical, (2) human 
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and  (3)  organisational  capital  resourcesiii.  Because  of  its  emphasis  on  human  and 
organisational capital,  the  theory  also  became  a major player in  the  debate  on  of SHRM. 
Before we describe the value added of this perspective to this research area, we summarise the 
basics of the RBV (cf. Barney, 1991). 
The basics 
A firm is  said to  have  a sustained competitive advantage when it is  implementing a value 
creating  strategy  that  is  not  simultaneously  implemented  by  any  current  or  potential 
competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy. 
The latter condition is necessary to make a distinction between a competitive advantage and a 
sustained competitive advantage.  The concept of sustained competitive advantage  does  not 
refer to the period of calendar time that a firm enjoys a competitive advantage. The question 
whether or not a competitive advantage is  a sustained one depends  upon  the  possibility of 
duplication by competing or new firms. This statement does not imply that it will last forever. 
Unanticipated  changes  in  the  environment  of the  firm  can  turn  a  source  of sustained 
competitive advantage into a resource no longer valuable to the firm.  Not all firm resources 
hold the potential of sustained competitive advantage. In order to have this potential, a firm 
resource  should be  characterised by four  criteria:  it should be (1)  valuable,  (2)  rare,  (3) 
inimitable and (4) non substitutable. In addition, the model assumes that resources vary across 
firms  within  an  industry or group  and that competing firms  cannot obtain these  resources 
(easily)  from  other  firms  or  resource  markets.  With  these  assumptions  of  resource 
heterogeneity and immobility, the RBV challenges the neoclassical view of the firm - stating 
perfect competition, highly mobile and homogeneous firm resources - and has become a new 
'theory of the firm', shedding light on the nature of firms and markets (Conner, 1991). 
The pool of  employees as a source of  sustained competitive advantage 
Within the area of SHRM, the RBV gives an answer to the question 'When (i.e.  under which 
conditions) do human resources matter (more)?' and provides a rationale for the reason why 
employees (labour) and HRM should be considered when striving for or studying competitive 
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advantage.  An important contribution in this respect is  the article of Wright, McMahan & 
McWilliams (1994). They checked whether the assumptions of human resource heterogeneity 
and immobility hold and whether the aforementioned criteria can be attributed to the pool of 
human capital under the firm's control in a direct employment relationship. Their contribution 
provides a theoretical discussion of the reason why and the circumstances under which human 
resources  can be a  source of sustained competitive advantage.  We summarise their  main 
conclusions in Table 1. 
Table 1  Human resources and sustained competitive advantage (assumptions) 
Assumptions 
Human resources are 
1. heterogeneous  Firms have different jobs which require different skills (demand for labour 
is  heterogeneous).  fudividuals  differ in  both the  type  and  level of their 
skills  (supply  of labour  is  heterogeneous)  (Steffy  &  Maurer,  1988). 
Because both demand for and supply of labour are heterogeneous, human 
resources will vary across firms. 
2. immobile  Human  resources  are not  perfectly mobile  because  there  are  substantial 
transaction  costs  involved in moving from  one  employment  situation to 
another (Abelson & Baysinger, 1984). An employee will only leave a frrm 
if  he/she  has  considered  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  all  the 
altematives and fmally finds an attractive alternative. 
Even if human resources are mobile, characteristics of the human capital 
pool such as causal ambiguity, social complexity and historical conditions 
(cf. infra) will resnlt in an immobile sustained competitive advantage. 
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Because of the heterogeneity in demand for and supply of labour, there is 
variance in individuals'  contribution to the fIrm.  This argues that human 
capital can create value to the fIrm.  A person with good communicative 
skills  will  perform  better  in  a  sales  job  then  a  person  with  less 
communicative skills. ill order to become a ceramist, it is not necessary to 
know a lot of languages, but one should be handy. 
The authors refer to work in the area of  utility analysis that provided both a 
rationale  for  the  ways  in  which  human  capital  resources  increase fIrm 
value and techniques for estimating this  value (Cronshaw &  Alexander, 
1986; Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Boudreau, 1983). 
2. rare 
To the extent that jobs require skills which allow for variance in individual 
contributions,  i.e.  when job-relevant skills  are not a  commodity,  these 
skills should be normally distributed in the population. Thus, under these 
conditions, high quality - with regard to one job - human resources are 
rare. 
Peteraf (1993) makes a distinction between fixed and quasi fIxed resources 
in this  context.  Fixed  resources  are  limited in supply and their supply 
cannot  be  expanded  (rare  by  defInition).  Quasi  fixed  resources  are 
resources limited in the short run, but which can be renewed and expanded 
incrementally  within  the  fIrm  that  utilises  them.  Utilisation  of such 
resources may in fact augment them, e.g. some skills and knowledge of a 
person can be expanded through one's experience or training. Prahalad & 
Hamel (1990) describe how core competencies, particularly those which 
involve collective learning and are knowledge-based are enhanced as they 
are applied. This may be another argument for the reason why people can 
enhance fIrm value (cf. human resources are valuable). 
3. inimitable 
ill order  to imitate  human  resources,  the  competitor  must  be  able  to 
identify  exactly  the  source  of  competitive  advantage,  i.e.  the  exact 
components of the human capital resource pool which are providing the 
advantage.  Second,  the  competitor must be able  to  duplicate  both  the 
relevant  components  of  the  human  capital  resource  pool  and  the 
circumstances under which these resources function. Three concepts play 
an  important role  in the  inimitability  of human  resources:  (1)  unique 
historical conditions, (2) causal ambiguity and (3) social complexity. 
8 Attributes 
Human resources are 
3. inimitable (continued) 
4. non-substitutable 
HRM and perfonnance - Research without theory? 
.. 
Unique  historical conditions detennine a firm's place in time  and  space 
(Barney, 1991). The ability of a firm to acquire and exploit particular firm 
resources may depend  upon  its  unique history.  Dierickx &  Cool (1989) 
maintain that how  imitable  an  asset is,  depends  upon  the  nature  of the 
process  by  which  it  was  accumulated.  Their  development  is  'path 
dependent' and history thus  matters. Would-be-imitators are hindered by 
the difficulty of discovering and repeating the developmental process and 
by the considerable lag involved. 
Causal ambiguity refers to uncertainty regarding the causes of efficiency 
differences  among  firms  and  exists  when  the  link  between  a  finn's 
resources  and  a  competitive  advantage  is  imperfectly  understood.  If 
would-be-imitators cannot identify specifically the  way in  which  a firm 
resource  acts  as  a competitive  advantage,  it is  virtually  impossible  to 
imitate the responsible resources (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). 
Social  complexity refers  to  the fact  that many  social phenomena  are  so 
complex  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  manage  or  influence  them 
systematically.  Human  resources  and  social complexity  are  intrinsically 
linked  because  social  complexity,  by  definition,  results  from  human 
interactions (Berger & Luckmann, 1985). Mueller (1996) states that social 
architecture is created and reshaped not only (or even primarily) at senior 
management level in the organisation, but at other levels too, especially on 
the shop-floor. It results from ongoing skill fonnation activities, forms of 
spontaneous  co-operation,  the  tacit  knowledge  that  accumulates  as  the 
unplanned side-effect of intentional corporate behaviour.  Given the  low 
visibility of these processes, the social architecture is likely to be resistant 
to easy imitation and therefore a valuable strategic asset. 
Human resources characterised by the above attributes are  immobile and 
thus bound to the firm. 
Wright &  al.  (1994)  argue  that human resources are one of the few  firm 
resources which have the potential to (1) not become obsolete and (2) be 
transferable  across  a  variety  of technologies,  products  and  markets.  It 
might be possible to substitute human resources in the short term, but it is 
highly  unlikely  that  such  substitution  could  result  in  a  sustained 
competitive advantage. The following example elucidates their reasoning. 
Firm A has a sustained competitive advantage thanks to its highly skilled 
and  well  developed  human  capital  pool.  Firm  B  introduces  a  new 
technology  and  increases  productivity such that productivity differences 
stemming from A's highly skilled and comrnited workers disappear. If  the 
technology can be purchased in the marketplace (which is likely) and firm 
A buys  it,  it wil  likely generate the  same productivity increases  and  its 
highly  skilled  work  force  will  once  again  constitute  a  sustained 
competitive advantage. 
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The authors conclude that the human capital pool is a potential source of sustained competitive 
advantage. However, the story does not end here. Despite its growing acceptance and the fact 
that  this  perspective  explains  the  importance  of  the  human  capital  pool  to  firm 
competitiveness,  it does  not  specifically  deal  with  how  an  organisation  can  develop  and 
support  the  human  resources  it needs  for  competitive  advantage  (Delery  &  Shaw,  2001). 
Having human resources with the right knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) does not yet 
mean that the firm will invest in its people. Even if the firm is prepared to invest, this does not 
yet mean that this investment will yield a return, i.e. that employees will behave automatically 
in accordance with broader strategy and that the firm will outperlorm its competitors. 
The HR system as a source of  sustained competitive advantage 
The  high  potential  human capital  pool  is  thus  a  necessary  but  not sufficient condition  to 
achieve high perlormance. It  should be managed and controlled in a way that enables the firm 
to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. As far as 
HR practices are  concerned, Wright & al.  (1994) develop  the  argument that while a firm's 
human resource capital pool may be a source of sustained competitive advantage, it is virtually 
impossible for  HR practices  to  be rare,  inimitable  and non-substitutable.  The  role  of HR 
practices is  one  of 'building'  the  human  capital  pool  and  stimulating the  kinds  of human 
behaviour that actually constitute an advantage. Other firms may copy the practices, but if they 
lack the quality of the employee talent,  they will not compete away the  advantage, or vice 
versa (Boxall & Steeneveld, 1999). Although the authors admit that HR practices are the most 
direct influence on the human capital of a firm,  they do not ascribe a primary role to them. 
Mueller (1996) as well admits that strategic HR practices are important in that they facilitate 
the  processes  underlying  the  social  architecture,  but he  does  not  attribute  them a  role  of 
overriding importance.  Other academics  (Becker &  Huselid,  1998;  Delery  &  Shaw,  1998; 
Huselid & al., 1997; Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Barney, 1995; Lado & Wilson, 1994) do so and 
state that the HR system can be a source of competitive advantage as well. An HR system in 
this context is defined as  'a set of distinct but interrelated activities, functions and processes 
that are directed at  attracting, developing and maintaining (or disposing of)  a firm's human 
resources'  (Lado  & Wilson, 1994). In order to  be  successful the conditions of internal (or 
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horizontal) and external (or vertical) fit should to be met (Delery,  1998). Internal fit refers to 
the alignment of HR practices into a coherent system of practices that support one another. 
External fit stands for the alignment of the HR system with broader organisational strategy and 
implies that if strategy changes, the HR system has to change as well. Fit and flexibility cannot 
be separated. 
How does this fit in with the logic of the RBV? The HR system can, in accordance with 
the pool of employees, be described as a strategic asset. Strategic assets are  'the set of difficult 
to imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialised resources and capabilities that bestow a firm's 
competitive advantage'  (Amit  &  Schoemaker,  1993).  Of importance here  is  the  distinction 
made between resources  and  capabilities. Resources are  stocks of available factors  that are 
owned or controlled by the firm. These resources consist of physical or financial assets, human 
capital or knowhow that can be traded (cf. physical and human capital as defined by Barney, 
1991).  Capabilities, on the other hand, refer to a firm's capacity to deploy resources, usually 
in  combination  and  by  using  organisational  processes,  to  effect  a  desired  end.  These  are 
information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are  firm-specific  and are developed 
over time through complex interactions among the firm's resources (cf. organisational capital 
as defined by Barney, 1991). Unlike resources, capabilities are based on developing, carrying 
and exchanging information through the firm's human capital. Whereas the pool of employees 
can be seen as a resource, the HR system is a capability. 
The emphasis on  'firm-specific tangible or intangible processes',  'developed over time' 
and  'complex  interactions'  in  the  definition  of  capabilities  is  very  important  because  it 
reminds  of the  aforementioned barriers to  imitation:  'causal ambiguity',  'path dependency' 
and 'social complexity'. These characteristics make it difficult to imitate the HR system that is 
deeply embedded in an organisation. It is especially difficult to grasp the precise mechanisms 
by which the interplay of human resource practices generates value (Becker &  Gerhart, 1996). 
Until now, researchers are struggling with the issue of interrelationships between practices. Is 
this  relationship  between  practices  additive  (1+1=2),  substitutable  (1+1=1)  or  synergistic 
(1+1=3 or 1+1=0) (Delery,  1998)? Moreover, the HR system and the pool of employees are 
developed over time and cannot be purchased in the market. The subtle changes to routines in 
the social architecture of a firm  can prevent imitators from copying the system successfully 
(Mueller,  1996). Further, even if they can copy a part of the system, there will be limits on 
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management's ability to replicate socially complex elements such as culture and interpersonal 
relationships (Boxall & Steeneveld, 1996). The inimitability of an HR system implies rareness 
and  to  a  certain  extent non-substitutability.  Moreover,  because  of its  interaction  with  the 
human capital pool, it is also valuable. In short, the HR system can be a source of  sustained 
competitive advantage. 
Relevance to the HRM-performance discussion 
The distinction between 'human capital advantage',  'human process advantage' and 'human 
resource  advantage',  made  by  Boxall  (1996)  summarises  the  above.  A  human  capital 
advantage results from employing people with competitively valuable knowledge, skills and 
abilities.  A  human process advantage  is  a  function  of difficult-to-imitate,  highly evolved 
processes within the firm, e.g.  mechanisms of cooperation and/or communication, teamwork 
or quality circles.  One could say that these processes  create the working conditions of the 
employees and thus the possibilities to unfold their talents. Accordingly, a human resource 
advantage is the superiority of a firm's HRM over another's - implying higher performance or 
sustained competitive advantage - and can be thought of as the product of its human capital 
and human process advantages. The role of HR practices is twofold in that they can influence 
both  the  human capital pool  and the  work processes.  On  the  one hand,  they  can  lead to 
competitive advantage through recruiting and developing a unique and valuable human capital 
pool. On the other hand, they may also lead to competitive advantage as part of organisational 
capital by providing firms with the necessary conditions to make the most of the employees' 
talents and with both increased fit and flexibility (Wright & Snell, 1998). 
The resource-based view provides a rationale for the reason why people and HR practices 
should be taken into account when studying the HRM-performance relationship. The theory 
elaborates on the conditions under which the pool of employees and HRM enable and enhance 
broader  organisational  strategy  in  order  to  strive  for  survival  or higher  performance.  In 
describing these conditions, elements from both economical and sociological theory are taken 
into account. However, the theory does not provide guidelines for the choice of people or HR 
practices and does not describe the mechanism through which the interaction of both can lead 
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to  higher perfonnance. The theory only describes the left side of the  framework.  Empirical 
research on the HRM-perfonnance relationship needs more. 
Human capital theory: to invest or not to invest? 
Although Wright & McMahan (1992) do not explicitly mention human capital theory (Becker, 
1964), we  would like to  draw the  attention on this  economical perspective because it  sheds 
some light on the mechanism linking HRM with performance. We move towards the right side 
of the framework. 
The basics 
According to human capital theory, people possess knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) that 
are  of economic value to  the finn.  Because of this  economic value,  a firm should invest to 
increase these KSAs, for example through HRM. These investments entail direct and indirect 
(opportunity)  costs and are  thus  - from  an  economic  point of view - only justified if they 
produce future returns to  the finn in the form  of increased worker productivity and  overall 
firm  performance.  Both costs  and  benefits  should thus be evaluated.  In order to  exert this 
'costlbenefit' analysis, one can use economic criteria such as  the  'net present-value method' 
and the 'internal rate of return method' (Barcala & al., 1999) or fonnulas trying to capture the 
added  value of certain HR  practices  as  proposed by utility  analysis  theory  (e.g.  efforts  to 
quantify  the  dollar value  of improvements  in  employee selection;  Boudreau,  1983).  If the 
balance  turns  out to  be positive,  the firm  will  invest time  and  money  in its  people.  These 
investments in HR activities  are  especially aimed at  increasing the  workers'  capabilities of 
performing activities of economic value. A logical consequence is that the higher the potential 
of employees to contribute to the finn, the more likely it will be for the firm to invest (more) 
in HR activities (Youndt & aI., 1996; Truss, 2001). 
Relevance to the HRM-perJormance discussion 
In  accordance  with  the  RBV,  human  capital  theory  recognises  the  importance  of  the 
composition of the human capital pool, HRM and the potential of both to contribute to  the 
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firm.  Both perspectives  thus  provide  a  rationale for  the  investment in  human  capital  and 
consider human resources as more than a cost to be minimised. 
As mentioned before, the RBV does not describe the mechanism through which the pool 
of employees and HRM can lead to higher performance. Human capital theory lifts a comer of 
the veil. The RBV elaborates on the conditions under which human resources form a source of 
sustained competitive advantage. One of these conditions is their economic value to the firm. 
This economic value, expressed in terms of KSAs, is the point of departure of human capital 
theory. We use the HRM-performance model of Delery &  Shaw (2001)  to make our point 
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The human capital model of the relationship between HR practices, work force 
characteristics, work force performance and fmn performance (Delery & Shaw, 2001) 
In what follows, we only describe the building blocks of the framework that are relevant at 
this point. The other cornerstones of the model, such as motivation, will be discussed later. 
From an economic point of view, the HRM issue is just a simple investment problem. All 
activities that will enhance the KSAs of the workforce and subsequently productivity and firm 
performance are worth to be considered. If  benefits outperform costs, the firm will invest. 
From  an  'HRM-firm  performance'  point  of view,  the  mediating  role  of KSAs  and 
productivity is very interesting. The added value of knowledge, skills and abilities is expressed 
in terms of productivity. HR practices can enhance KSAs of employees by means of good 
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selection  procedures  or  training.  If KSAs  increase,  so  will  productivity.  In  turn,  this 
productivity increase will have a positive impact on firm performance. HRM does  thus not 
influence firm performance directly, but through a causal chain of mediating variables. 
With respect to the mediating performance variables, many authors (Guest, 2001; Rogers 
&  Wright,  1998;  Becker &  al.,  1997; Dyer &  Reeves,  1995) believe that outcomes can be 
differentiated at hierarchical levels,  with performance at one level contributing (along with 
other factors) to outcomes at the next level. Although the models found in literature differ in 
the number of levels and the exact outcomes, a generic form of the model is that HR practices 
have their most direct impact on employee performance and subsequently to what we  call 
'operational'  performance  (e.g.  productivity).  This  operational  performance,  in  turn, 
contributes to higher level organisational performance constructs, such as financial accounting 
performance  and  market  performance.  By mentioning  employee  performance  as  the  first 
outcome in the  'performance chain', we shift our focus from the organisational level (macro) 
of analysis to the individual level (micro). 
Behavioural approach theory: the missing link 
How can one be sure that a promising human capital pool and the willingness of the firm to 
invest in it through HRM, will indeed end up in higher overall firm performance? The answer 
is  'investing in the right HR practices'. But how  can one distinguish them? The answer is 
partly found in the behavioural approach theory. 
The basics 
The advocates of the behavioural perspective state that different strategies require different 
behaviours and, therefore, different HR practices to elicit and reinforce those behaviours. The 
reSUlting  behaviours are said to  subsequently promote enhanced organisational performance 
(Erras, 2002; Guest, 1997; Snell,  1992; Schuler & Jackson,  1987). This view is very useful 
because it provides the missing link between strategy, the human capital pool, investment in 
HRM and  performance in the RBV, namely needed and actual employee behaviour. Through 
the  introduction  of employee  behaviour,  it also  furthers  the  causal  chain  of performance 
15 HRM and performance - Research without theory? 
outcomes as proposed by the human capital theory. The definition that has been given to HR 
practices in the behavioural perspective emphasises the role of employee behaviour. Schuler 
(1992) defines HR practices as  'all those activities affecting behaviour of individuals in their 
efforts to formulate and implement the strategic needs of the business'. Jackson &  al.  (1989) 
state that HR practices are 'tools for shaping patterns of behaviour that integrate the activities 
of individuals  within  an  organisation,  thereby  helping  to  orchestrate  the  achievement  of 
organisational  goals  and objectives'.  HR practices  should thus  be matched  not  only  with 
competitive strategies, but also  with  (the perceptions of)  needed role behaviours  from  the 
employees (Schuler & Jackson,  1987). The conceptual framework in Table 2 is based upon 
the work of Guest (1997) and visualises the approach. 
Table 2  The link: between HRM and performance in the behavioural framework 
Operational  FinanciaI/ 












A  firm traces out an  organisational strategy in answer to strategic business  needs  such  as 
management's  overall plan for  survival,  growth,  adaptability  or profitability.  In order to 
enable and enhance this strategy certain employee behaviours  are necessary.  The work of 
Schuler & Jackson (1987) can serve as a clear-cut example. They state that firms pursuing an 
innovation strategyV,  require employees with (a) a high degree of creative behaviour,  (b)  a 
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longer-tenn focus,  (c) a relatively high level of cooperative, interdependent behaviour, (d)  a 
moderate  degree  of concern  for  quality  and  quantity,  (e)  an  equal  degree  of concern  for 
process and results, (f) a greater degree of risk taking and  (g)  a high tolerance of ambiguity 
and uncertainty.  Once the needed role behaviour is  defined, one has  to  decide upon the HR 
practices that should be introduced in  order to  adjust the  actual role behaviour in  the right 
direction. In this respect, Pfeffer (1981) states that 'behaviour is guided by purpose'. In the 
case of an innovation strategy, Schuler & Jackson (1987) mention the following HR practices: 
(a) jobs that require close interaction  and  coordination among individuals,  (b)  perfonnance 
appraisals that are more likely to reflect longer-tenn and group-based achievements, (c) jobs 
that allow  employees to  develop  skills  that can be used in other positions  in  the  finn,  (d) 
compensation  systems  that  emphasise  internal  equity rather  than  external  or market-based 
equity, (e) pay rates that tend to be low, but that allow employees to be stockholders and have 
more freedom to choose the mix  of components and (f) broad career paths to  reinforce the 
development of a broad range  of skills.  The underlying  assumption is  that appropriate HR 
practices lead to the desired employees' behaviour. Although not mentioned in the framework, 
a necessary condition is that the workforce has the appropriate knowledge, skills and abilities. 
The behavioural approach viewed as an open system 
Whereas the model of Guest (1997) is rather static, Wright &  Snell (1991) propose a more 
dynamic  framework.  Although both models  are  causal, Wright &  Snell  (1991)  leave  some 
room for  a constant monitoring  and/or  adjustment  of the  HR  practices  and  outcomes  (cf. 
infra).  The  authors  portray the  behavioural  approach  in  an  open  system  model  (Figure 3) 
receiving inputs from the environment and then transforming those inputs into some outputs 
for  an  outside  group  or  system.  They  propose  that  the  inputs  in  the  HR  system  are 
competencies (KSAs) of the individuals in the organisation that the finn must import from its 
external environment. The throughput process focuses on the behaviours of those individuals 
in the  organisational  system.  Finally the  output consist of both  perfonnance  and  affective 
outcomes and is fully determined by the input and throughput processes. Affective outcomes 
consist in any feelings that employees have as result of being part of the organisation, e.g. job 
satisfaction or involvement. Performance outcomes include all aspects of perfonnance such as 
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the quality of the product or service, or profits. Although not present in Figure 3, central to 
open systems models is the idea of a negative feedback loop that infonns the system that it is 
not functioning effectively, thereby allowing for changes to reduce any discrepancies. If the 
outputs are measured, they can have a signalling function.  If the desired output(level) is not 
obtained,  HR  policy  can  be  changed  in  order  to  influence  the  competencies  and/or  the 
behaviours of the human capital pool (single  loop learning).  The output(level) itself can be 
questioned as well. In this case, one questions the standard that has been set before, evaluates 
whether it is  still adequate and decides whether or not action should be undertaken (double 
loop  learning).  This  concept  of  circular  (feedback)  mechanisms  stems  from  cybematic 
systems theory, referred to by Wright & McMahan (1992). 
ENVIRONMENT 
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ORGANISATION 
The Human Resource System 
INPUTS  THROUGH- OUTPUTS 
Competencies:  PUTS  Affective 
Knowledge  Behaviours  outcomes 
Skills  Performance 
Abilities  outcomes 
Figure 3  An open system model of the HR system (Wright & Snell, 1991). 
The  major role  of SHRM according  to  Wright  &  Snell  (1991)  is  (1)  to  ensure  that  the 
organisation has the competencies necessary to carry out a given strategy and (2) to manage 
the interface between the competencies and behaviours of the system and the organisational 
strategy. Therefore, the HR manager should focus on both competence management strategies 
(Competence  Acquisition,  Utilisation,  Retention  and  Displacement)  and  behaviour 
management strategies (Behaviour Control and Coordination). The authors link specific HR 
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practices  with  each  strategy.  Participation,  quality  circles,  job enrichment,  promotions  or 
transfers  e.g.  can  serve  as  methods for Competence Utilisation.  Performance appraisal  and 
compensation practices on the other hand are techniques in order to Control Behaviour. The 
purpose of their article is to show how different HR practices can be integrated into a holistic 
activity. The more congruence that is achieved among the HR practices, the higher will be the 
effectiveness (output) of HR in general (internal fit).  In  addition, they also state that the HR 
practices  should  be  integrated  with  the  strategic  business  plan  in  order  to  achieve  high 
performance (external fit). 
Before we  proceed,  we  would like  to  draw  attention  to  the  difference  between  an HR 
system in the RBV and an HR system as defined by Wright & Snell (1991). In the RBV, the 
HR system refers to the interrelationships between practices. The question is asked whether 
practices  used by the organisation fit  into a coherent system or  'bundle'  of practices  that 
enhance and support the effectiveness of one another (Delery & Doty, 1996; McDuffie, 1995). 
Wright & Snell (1991) also mention the importance of internal fit, but in their open system 
approach  the HR  system consists  of more elements  than  the  'bundled'  HR practices.  The 
competencies and behaviours of the human capital pool as well as their performance belong to 
the system as well. In what follows, we will use the term HR system as used in the RBV. 
Relevance to the HRM-peiformance discussion 
As mentioned before, the behavioural perspective, the human capital theory and the RBV are 
complementary (Becker & Huselid,  1998). The latter emphasises the attributes required so 
that  firm  resources  or capabilities  can  generate  a  competitive  advantage,  the  two  former 
theories focus on the mechanism through which strategy can be enabled or enhanced in order 
to  compete.  Because of this  complementarity,  these  perspectives  are  followed  with  much 
greater frequency in empirical research on the HRM-performance link than other frameworks 
(Delery & Shaw, 1998). 
The  RBV  as  well  as  the  behavioural  approach  emphasises  the  need for  internal  and 
external  fit  in  order  to  achieve  high  performance.  And  fit  implies  flexibility.  The  'open 
systems  approach'  to  view  the  HRM-performance  relationship  is  very  interesting  in this 
respect because it provides a dynamic model of constant monitoring and internal adjustment. 
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Strategy,  behaviour  and  HR  practices  are  not  seen  as  static  facts,  but  can  be  subject  to 
changes. 
Behavioural process theories: opening the black box 
Although the behavioural perspective recognises the role of HR practices, the mediating role 
of competencies (KSAs) and the link between HRM and behaviour, this theory does not focus 
on the internal thoughts or cognitive processes - the black box - that influence decisions about 
workplace behaviour (Takeuchi, 2002; Ramsay & aI., 2000). In order to get a full picture, the 
model should be  extended with  behavioural process theories such as  'expectancy'  (Vroom, 
1964), 'equity' (Adams, 1963) or 'social exchange' (Blau, 1964) theory. These psychological 
theories highlight the mediating role of attitudes, in particular of motivation. 
The basics 
Each of the above theories addresses the basic question:  'What determines the willingness of 
an individual to exert personal effort to work at tasks that contribute to the performance of the 
work unit and the organisation?'. The answer, according to the expectancy theory, is found in 
a person's beliefs regarding effort-performance relationships and the outcomes associated with 
different levels of performance accomplishment.  'People will do what they can do when they 
want to do it' (Schermerhorn & al., 1998). An individual will (be motivated to) act in a certain 
way based on (1) the expectation that the act will be followed by a given outcome and (2) the 
attractiveness of that outcome to the individual. Equity theory states that each employee seeks 
a fair balance between what he puts into hislher job (e.g.  effort, skills,  ability, tolerance or 
commitment)  and  what he/she  gets  out  of it  (e.g.  financial  rewards,  benefits,  recognition, 
responsibility,  training  or promotion).  In  order  to  have  an  idea of what  constitutes  a fair 
balance, he/she will compare hislher own situation with other referents on the workfloor or in 
the market place, e.g. colleagues or employees exerting the same job in an other company. If 
the employee feels that hislher inputs are adequately and fairly rewarded, then he/she will be 
motivated. If  not, he/she will become demotivated and will act in a way to correct this 'unfair' 
situation, e.g. by reducing effort, being disruptive or seeking an alternative job. These actions 
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imply a decrease in individual perfonnance and subsequently in organisational perfonnance. 
Finally, in the same line of reasoning, social exchange theorists examine the exchanges that 
occur between employers and employees regarding perceptions .of reciprocity. The essence is 
that  employees  feel  obliged  to  respond  equitably  to  treatments  from  others,  e.g.  one's 
employer. They seek a balance in the exchange relationship with the organisation and will 
align their attitudes and/or behaviours to the degree of the employer's commitment to them. 
Relevance to the HRM-performance discussion 
Although the aforementioned theories are primarily concerned with motivation, they also say 
something about the link between motivation  and individual  perfonnance.  It  proposes  that 
high perfonnance depends on high motivation, possession of the necessary skills and abilities, 
an appropriate role and understanding of that role (Guest, 2001; Guest,  1997). It's clear that 
HR practices  can  play an  important role.  HRM decides  upon  the  (financial)  outcome  an 
employee will get, but also on actions that have to be undertaken in order to guarantee that an 
employee has the necessary skills and abilities and that he/she is assigned to a job he/she can 
handle.  Moreover,  HR practices  influence  what  employees  can  expect  from  their job  or 
employer (e.g.  through reliable job descriptions, opportunities for promotion) and what they 
will get in return (e.g. training, participation, rewards, financial participation). We mention the 
research on psychological contracts in this respect. HR practices can shape employee beliefs 
regarding the tenns of the employee-organisation exchange relationship and the alignment of 
various  HR practices  can help  an  organisation to  send a consistent message to  employees 
regarding  mutual  expectations  (Rousseau  &  Greller,  1994;  Guest,  1998).  This  stream  of 
research  focuses  on  individual  perceptions  stemming  from  a  set  of  practices.  Both 
psychological contract and individual perceptions are best viewed as  the linking mechanism 
between HR practices and individual attitudes and behaviours (Wright & Boswell, 2002). We 
extend the framework in Table 2 to visualise the above (Table 3). Next to motivation, other 
attitudes such as commitment, involvement and satisfaction are mentioned. 
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Table 3  The link between HRM and perfonnance 
































The  underlying  assumption  is  that  appropriate  HR  practices  tap  employees'  attitudesvii• 
Depending  on  the  attitude  one  is  focusing  on,  these  HR  practices  are  labelled  'High 
commitment work practices'  or  'High involvement work practices'. In tum, these  attitudes 
influence individual behaviour and performance (Guest, 2001).  Both causal links have been 
studied a great deal in the field of industrial psychology. 
In  Table 3 attitudes have a mediating role between HR practices and behaviours.  In the 
open systems approach of Wright & Snell (1991), attitudes are seen as affective outcomes, an 
output of behaviour. We are inclined to follow the view of Guest (1997, 2001) and rather see 
attitudes as a consequence of HR practices, which can influence behaviour in interaction with 
competencies  (KSAs).  Recent articles  (Takeuchi,  2002;  Guest,  2001;  Ramsay  & al.,  2000) 
support our choice. In a review article, Guest (2001) mentions two studies in this respect. The 
first  one  indicates  that  a greater use  of HR practices  is  associated directly  and  indirectly, 
through satisfaction and commitment, with a range of positive outcomes. The second survey 
shows a path from HR practices to performance through commitment and flexibility. Ramsay 
&  al.  (2000),  in  tum,  tested  three  'High  performance  work  systems  - organisational 
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performance'  models  with  different  mediating  variables:  (1)  the  high-commitment 
management model (commitment), (2)  the high-involvement management model (discretion) 
and (3) the labour process model (job strain). The first model stresses the contribution of HR 
practices  to  employee  commitment  as  the  key  to  performance,  while  the  second  model 
attaches more importance to the role of discretion. Both models assume that the introduction 
of HR practices goes hand in hand with positive employee outcomes and subsequently high 
organisational performance. Conversely, the labour process model conceptualises that HPWS 
practices lead directly  or indirectly  (through  enhanced work intensification, insecurity  and 
discretion)  to  stress.  This  negative  employee  outcome  subsequently  leads  to  improved 
performance. Although the results called all three of the models into question, their attempt 
shows  that  introducing  mediating  variables  such  as  attitudes  and  other  job  related 
characteristics can enrich the HRM-performance discussion and perhaps the theory building 
process. 
Although a lot of empirical work has been done in the field of industrial psychology and 
the first  studies appear in the SHRM area,  research within the latter field has  not yet fully 
explored these  theories  (Takeuchi,  2002;  Monks  &  Schuster,  2001;  Ramsay  &  al.,  2000; 
Guest, 1997). In spite of this, we think that the key to open the black box can be found in this 
research area. 
Agency/transaction cost theory: room for opportunism? 
Before we return to the organisational level of analysis, we would like to draw the reader's 
attention to  two,  more economic oriented, theories:  agency (Jensen & Meckling,  1976) and 
transaction cost theory  (Williamson,  1979).  We include both theories  at this  point because 
they  also  seek  to  explain  control  of behaviour  in  organisations,  but  take  issues  such  as 
bounded  rationality  and  opportunistic  behaviour  into  account.  Both  factors  can  have 
implications for the design of the HRM. 
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The basics 
The literature on transaction cost economics is developed in order to explain the relationship 
between organisational level variables (structure and technology) and individual perfonnance 
and  satisfaction  (Jones,  1984).  Agency  theory  on  the  other  hand  is  developed  in  the 
information economics literature to  model the relationship between one party (the principal) 
who delegates work to another (the agent). In the HRM context, the principal is the employer 
or HR manager, the agent is the employee. 
Two central concepts within these theories are bounded rationality and opportunism. The 
former refers to the assumption that people are subject to infonnation processing limits, the 
latter to the assumption that people will act with self-interest and guile in pursuing their own 
goals. Both are seen as  human characteristics serving as  major obstacles to human exchange 
when combined with uncertainty, situations of asymmetric information and small numbers of 
possible  exchange  relationships.  In  short,  organisations  are  viewed  as  collectives  of self-
interested  people  with  partially  conflicting  goals  and  therefore  human  exchange  will  not 
automatically pass  off efficiently.  According  to  the  theory,  these conflicts  can be resolved 
through the alignment of goals by means of contracts and incentives (Eisenhardt, 1988).  'Fit' 
in this context refers to the alignment of individual employee interests with those of the finn 
(Becker & Huselid, 1998). The costs associated with establishing efficient contracts between 
parties are called transaction or agency costs.  The purpose is to  find  the  first-best solution 
under the circumstances of opportunistic behaviour, uncertainty and asymmetric infonnation, 
while minimising transaction costs. 
Although  non-strategic  detenninants  (e.g.  opportunistic  behaviour,  competing  interests) 
are entering the story, we mention both theories here because the founders  of these theories 
believe that one can cope with these problems in a 'rational' way, by designing the optimal 
contract  and  using  the  right  incentives.  In  order  to  illustrate  our  reasoning,  we  give  the 
following  HR  example.  An  employer  has  to  hire  an  employee  to  produce  high  quality 
products. If  quality is not perfect, the employer cannot sell the product and will  suffer great 
losses.  A candidate applies and  although he/she seems quite convincing, the employer does 
not  know  whether  the  candidate  will  exert  hislher  task  well  once  he/she's  hired  (moral 
hazard). One way to avoid this problem is to make the salary of the employee dependent upon 
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the quality of hislher products. High quality means high salary, low quality means low salary. 
This  performance-based pay is  one  possible HR  practice in  order to  steer the  employee's 
(opportunistic) behaviour. 
Relevance to the HRM-performance discussion 
How does this fit in with the HRM-performance discussion? First of all, the central premise of 
agency/transaction cost theory is  that employees have strong incentives to  shirk and freeride 
and  no  incentive  to  increase  their  performance  unless  task  conditions  allow  them  to 
demonstrate  discrete  performance  contributions  and  to  obtain  rewards  that  accrue  from 
increased performance (Jones,  1984). The role of HR practices is to create these optimal task 
conditions  (Wright  &  McMahan,  1992).  Once  again,  HR  practices  are  seen  as  steering 
mechanisms to align employees' behaviour with organisational objectives. Agency/transaction 
cost  theory  implicitly  recognise  the  potential  role  of  HRM  and  people  in  achieving 
competitive  advantage.  A  second  remark  concerns  the  insights  this  theory  can  provide  to 
broader HRM strategy literature. MacDuffie (1995) summarised the necessary conditions for 
an  HRM-performance relationship  as  follows:  (1)  when  employees possess  knowledge  and 
skills the managers lack, (2) when employees are motivated to apply this skill and knowledge 
through discretionary effort and (3) when the firm's business or production strategy can only 
be achieved when  employees contribute such  discretionary effort. As  far  as  (2)  and  (3)  are 
concerned,  both  have  been  mentioned  in  the  behavioural  approach.  The  first  condition 
however emphasises  the  information  asymmetry  between  employer and  employee  and the 
need for mechanisms to overcome this situation. The added value of contracting literature can 
be  found  here:  organisations  that  are  more  successful  in  eliciting  the  appropriate  use  of 
information will have a competitive advantage (Becker &  Huselid,  1998). Firms understand 
that employees have valuable and specific knowledge and many have no choice but to rely on 
employees  to  use  that  information  to  successfully  implement  the  firm's  strategy.  Direct 
participation or teams are two well-known examples of HR practices in this context. 
In accordance  with  Guest  (2001),  we  describe  the  interest  of  economists  in  human 
resources issues as a positive development in theory building. However, economical theory is 
narrow  and  simplistic  (especially  in  comparison  with  sociological  or  psychological 
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perspectives). As  mentioned before, the aim is to find the first-best solution under particular 
circumstances, while minimising transaction costs. This approach reduces the design of HRM 
to a mathematical problem and simplifies reality considerably. Moreover, economists tend to 
use a short list of highly specific and easily quantifiable HR practices. Payments systems and 
training for  example  figure  prominently  when  economic  oriented theories,  such  as  human 
capital or agency theory, are  tested in  the HRM context.  Calculating the economic value of 
practices  such  as  structural  participation  is  more  difficult.  The effect of quality circles  on 
productivity for example is not unambiguous. On the one hand, there is a time-loss due to the 
meeting time, on the other hand there may be productivity gains thanks to the problem-solving 
or creative skills of the employees participating in the quality circle. Contracting literature has 
been extensively applied to executive compensation issues, to a lesser extent to training. It has 
not been widely extended to other HR practices. 
What about tbe environment and political games? 
As mentioned before, we had to include the individual level of analysis in an attempt to open 
the black box  and enhance our understanding of the link between HRM and organisational 
performance. In the following paragraph we return to the organisational level of analysis. 
Although Wright & Snell (1991) proposed an  'open systems approach' with regard to the 
HR  system  within  the  organisation,  all  of the  perspectives  discussed  above  approach  the 
organisation  as  a  rather  closed  system.  Any  interaction  with  its  broader  environment  is 
underplayed  or even  ignored.  Truss  (2001)  for  example  argued  that  the  influence  of the 
external environment should not be discounted to the extent suggested by the resource-based 
view.  Wright &  McMahan  (1992)  on  the  other hand  state  that the  behavioural perspective 
views the organisation as a rather closed system. 
Another criticism with regard to the  aforementioned perspectives is that they all  adopt a 
'rational model'  of organisations  and  activities  within  those  organisations  (Mueller,  1996). 
This  view  suggests  that  the  fit  between  organisation  and  individual  represents  a  quite 
attainable objective, including the reciprocity of needs and interest, as well as emphasising the 
importance of cooperation. This perspective has been the implicit assumption of most theories 
and  research  in  SHRM  and  remained  unquestioned  for  a  long  time.  Despite  its  obvious 
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contributions, this perspective has been criticised as  being naive and overly optimistic  about 
the possibility of maximising individual and organisational needs and underplaying the issues 
of competing  interests,  power and  politics  (Ferris  &  Judge,  1991).  The  findings  of Truss 
(2001) also lend support to the argument that the infonnal organisation has a key role to play 
in the HRM process, such that infonnal practices and nonns of behaviour interact with fonnal 
HR policies. People can  act in a way either to  enable or constrain the realisation of fonnal 
organisation policy. 
Wright & McMahan (1992) recognise both critiques and focus on non-strategic theories of 
HRM such as resource-dependence, political influence and institutional theory. According to 
them,  these theories describe non-strategic  and possibly even dysfunctional determinants of 
HRM practices. Moreover, institutional theory  also takes the wider environment into account. 
As  the  way in  which  HRM is  shaped  will  certainly influence its  perfonnance,  we  cannot 
ignore these theories. 
Resource dependence and political influence theory: power & politics are facts of life 
The basics 
The resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) focuses predominantly on power 
relationships within and  among organisations. It assumes that all  organisations depend on a 
flow of valuable resources into the organisation in order to continue functioning. The ability to 
exercise control over these resources can provide an  individual or group with an  important 
source of power (Pfeffer, 1981). Power will increase when the resource becomes more scarce 
and thus more valuable. The political influence perspective follows naturally from this line of 
argument  and  characterises  organisations  as  'battlegrounds'  where  various  internal  and 
external stakeholders compete to influence critical decision criteria in a way that furthers their 
own  interests  (Kanter  &  Brinkerhoff,  1981).  The  most  powerful  stakeholder  will  be  the 
winner. And the winner will become even more powerful. Ferris & Judge (1991) describe this 
as  a  contest  between  political  players  to  construct  organisational  reality  (cf.  Berger  & 
Luckmann,  1985)  in  a manner  consistent  with  their  own  political  interest.  They  see  this 
construction of reality as  'the creation and management of shared meanings by individuals'. In 
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order  to  establish  these  meanings,  some  individuals  will  act  upon  the  complexity  and 
ambiguity that are inherent in an  organisation. The  'shared meanings' provide guidelines for 
future interpretations and organisational behaviour. The underlying idea is thus to manage the 
meaning  of the  situation  to  produce  the  outcomes  desired.  The  emphasis  is  on  deliberate 
attempts to control the shared meanings of phenomena. Routine or mindless activity and types 
of deliberate behaviour that are not specifically geared toward creating, maintaining or altering 
shared meanings are not considered as political behaviour. 
According  to Ferris  &  Judge  (1991),  RRM is  one  of the  critical  decision  areas  in  an 
organisation. Wright & McMahan (1992) also believe that some (RR) actions or practices are 
not resulting from proactive and strategic decision making, but are undertaken to create and/or 
maintain a certain situation or position. Although the point of departure is comparable to the 
one in agency/transaction cost theory, the political influence perspective does not believe one 
can cope with these political forces or power issues in a rational way. 
Relevance to the HRM.-performance link 
These perspectives have not yet been explored in the empirical HRM-perfonnance research. 
However, Wright  &  McMahan  (1992)  consider it  as  a potential framework to explain  and 
understand non-strategic, and sometimes even dysfunctional, determinants of HRM.  In order 
to enforce their arguments they make an  appeal on  a few  studies of Pfeffer and colleagues 
(Pfeffer &  Moore,  1980;  Pfeffer &  Cohen,  1984;  Pfeffer  &  Davis-Blake,  1987;  Pfeffer & 
Langton,  1988)  aimed  at  examining  the  characteristics  of the  organisational  context  that 
influence HR practices and on a review article of Ferris & Judge (1991). In what follows, we 
will summarise the conclusions of these studies. 
Pfeffer & Moore (1980) found out that the relative power base of a university department, 
i.e.  the  extent  to  which  the  department  had  control  over scarce  resources  of value  to  the 
organisation,  affects  the budget  allocation  to that department.  Seven  years  later, Pfeffer & 
Davis-Blake (1987) drew the parallel with pay allocation schemes and hypothesised that pay 
allocations are not only based on perfonnance criteria, but also on power. The authors found 
support for this assertion. The same functions in public and private institutions were compared 
and it seemed that these functions were paid higher in the institution in which the functions 
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deemed  more  important.  Another  study  (Pfeffer  &  Langton,  1988)  examined  other 
determinants of reward distributions in organisations. The authors started from the assumption 
that units  in  which  individuals  have  equal  outputs  or equal  degrees  of human  capital,  i.e. 
experience  or productivity,  will  have  more  equal  salary  distributions  than  units  in  which 
individuals  vary  more along either inputs  or outcomes.  A  'rational'  assumption  typical  of 
human capital  theory.  Their findings  showed that - unless the fact  that they controlled for 
variations in human capital - private control, larger departmental size and a greater tendency 
to  work alone  were  all  associated with  more  dispersed wages.  More  social  contact among 
departmental members, more democratic and participative departmental governance and more 
demographic  homogeneity  were  associated  with  more  equal  salary  distribution.  Finally, 
Pfeffer & Cohen (1984) stated that power relationships, such as unionisation, might affect the 
development of internal labour markets. Their results showed that non-unionised finns were 
more likely to  develop internal labour markets. The authors hypothesise that this happens in 
order to avoid unionisation. Pfeffer (1989) has also examined staffing and hiring practices in 
organisations  from  a  political  influence  perspective.  He  approaches  hiring  standards  and 
criteria  as  the  outcomes  of competition  among  individuals  or groups,  each  attempting  to 
control the types of people that are brought into the organisation to further their own interests. 
They compete for control over the personnel selection system decision criteria. The winning 
coalition then  structures the staffing system.  Kanter & Brinkerhoff (1981),  in  tum,  studied 
appraisal systems in organisations. They suggest that managers not only try to enhance others' 
impressions of them, but also try to influence the criteria by which others judge them. 
The above does indeed shows that certain practices can be the result of political actions 
instead of rationally and strategically decision making. Resource-dependence theory and the 
political  influence  perspective  are  thus  in  essence  theories  about  the  determinants  of HR 
practices.  Compared  to  the  aforementioned  theories,  both  approaches  use  a  completely 
different  framework  in  which  the  link  between  HRM  and  perfonnance  is  not  implicitly 
present. 
From a SHRM point of view, this perspective gives a rather 'destructive' impression. In 
striving  for  broader  organisational  goals,  hidden  agendas  have  to  be  taken  into  account. 
Whereas the RBV approaches scarcity and economic value of a finn's resource as a source of 
competitive advantage, the resource dependency theory sees it as  a source of power.  In  the 
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same line of reasoning, one can state that the role of HRM is important in both views, but for 
other reasons. If  the organisation realises that good human resources are scarce and valuable, 
this can increase the power base of the HR function. This is actually a positive element. The 
consolidation of the HR function is a necessary condition in order to introduce HR practices in 
a more strategic way. The role of the HR manager, as well as the question whether he/she is 
part of the 'dominant coalition', are  central issues in this perspective. These approaches  are 
certainly interesting with regard to broader (S)HRM literature in  that they could be used to 
understand the  destructive powers in  the  development of HRM or the  position of the HR 
manager in organisations. They can thus certainly contribute to a better understanding of the 
determinants of HRM.  Although  HRM is  usually considered  as  a  given  in  studies  on  the 
HRM-performance link,  it may  also  explain  the  (absence  of)  impact of HRM on broader 
organisational performance. 
Institutional theory: the way organisations are, is the legitimate way to organise 
Apart  from  internal  political  forces,  a  variety  of  exogenous  influences  can  restrict 
management's room for manoeuvre (Boselie &  al., 2001) or affect the adoption of particular 
personnel practices. These external factors  include such things as  governmental regulations, 
labour market conditions, current management fads and industry norms (Jackson & aI., 1989). 
The basics 
Institutional theory suggests that firm  managers take these external factors  into account to 
formulate  their HR policies  and practices  (Eisenhardt,  1988).  A  distinction  can be  drawn 
between external factors that restrict the choices of management, such as legislation or labour 
market  conditions,  and  external  influences  that  do  not  restrict,  but  guide  the  choices  of 
management, such as management fads or industry norms. 
The  first  category  of  factors  is  imposed  upon  management  by  external  players 
(government or trade unions) or conditions  (labour market condition or economic climate). 
(HR.)  Managers  cannot neglect  them without taking risks. If legislation  prescribes  that  an 
employees council should be introduced in firms of 100 employees and more, the firm will 
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have  to  introduce  this  fonn of structural participation.  Trade unions  can  exert  pressure  to 
upgrade  compensation  or can  prevent  the  introduction  of financial  participation.  Extreme 
shortage  of qualified  staff  on  the  labour  market  can  enhance  training  efforts  within  the 
company. Boselie &  aI.  (2001)  plead to take these differences in context into account, both 
from an economic and industrial relations point of view.  They state that the majority of the 
literature concerning the link between HRM and perfonnance originates from the USA or UK. 
The resulting body of empirical work suggests innovative HR practices without taking into 
account  differences  in  institutional  or cultural  settings.  The  question  arises  whether  these 
models, however appropriate they might be for the USA or UK, hold in other contexts. This 
view  can  thus  be  very  useful  for  explaining  differences  in  HR  practices  that  occur  in 
organisations facing  different legal environments  (Jackson  & aI.,  1989)  or having different 
cultural backgrounds. 
The second category of factors are not imposed upon management, but do influence them, 
according to institutional theorists. They argue that organisations copy practices they see being 
used  by  others  and/or they  adopt  practices  to  gain  legitimacy  and  acceptance.  Eisenhardt 
(1988)  describes  the  key  idea of institutionalism  as  follows:  'Much  organisational  action 
reflects a pattern of doing things that evolves over time  and becomes legitimated within an 
organisation  and  an  environment.  Therefore,  it  is  possible  to  predict  practices  within 
organisations from perceptions of  legitimate behaviour derived from cultural values, industry 
tradition,  firm  history,  popular management folklore,  and the  like.  Things are done  in  a 
certain way simply because it has become the only acceptable way of  doing them. ' 
Policies or practices that are  introduced this way  and  have evolved over time are  often 
resistant to change, even in the face of major changes within the company, e.g. in job content 
or used technology. Structures and processes become part of an integrated whole in which it is 
difficult to change any part without unravelling the whole or without meeting resistance to this 
change.  Whereas  the  RBV  sees  path  dependency  and  social  complexity  as  attributes 
contributing to competitive advantage, institutional theory also discusses the fact that both can 
be source of resistance  when  change is needed.  This  is  in  contradiction  with  the need of 
flexibility in  SHRM literature.  In  short,  the  'social architecture'  can be  constructive at one 
time, but can become destructive at another. 
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Relevance to the HRM-performance discussion 
In  accordance  with  the  resource  dependence  and  the  political  influence  perspective, 
institutional  theory  focuses  on  non-strategic  determinants  of  HR  practices.  Contrary  to 
resource dependence and political influence theory, the institutional theory has been used in 
empirical research on the HRM-performance link.  The idea that differences in cultural or 
institutional settings may have an impact on the HRM in  organisations has been subject of 
many comparative studies  (Boselie,  2002;  Boselie &  al.,  2001; Ichniowski & Shaw,  1999; 
Ngo &  al.  1998). Boselie (2002)  assumes that institutional theory can also provide  useful 
insights in the HRM-performance field. We briefly discuss his work. 
Boselie (2002) suggests that significant institutional differences between the USA and the 
Netherlands  affect  the  relationship  between  HRM  and  performance.  Secondly,  he  also 
assumes that there are institutional differences within one country, more specifically on the 
level of branches of industry, that can have an impact on the HRM-performance relationship. 
His empirical analysis is focused on the latter assumption. In order to develop his conceptual 
framework (Figure 4), he relies on the neo-institutionalism of Dimaggio & Powell (1983). 
These  authors  state  that  'as  managers  try  to  change  their  organisations  in  response  to 
institutional  pressures,  they  make  them  increasingly  similar'.  They  call  this  process 
'institutional  isomorphism'.  Three  mechanisms  are  said  to  influence  decision-making  in 
organisations and thus the process of isomorphism:  (1) coercive mechanisms - which stem 
from political influence and the problem of legitimacy, (2) mimetic mechanisms - which result 
from standard responses to uncertainty, e.g. imitation and (3) normative mechanisms - which 
stem from norms and values inherent to the profession of employees. Roughly, one could say 
that the coercive factors  are  the external factors  that restrict managers in taking decisions. 
Mimetic and normative mechanisms on the other hand are  the factors  guiding managers in 
taking decisions. 
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Figure 4  Conceptual model (Boselie, 2002) 
Boselie (2002) fits  these mechanisms in with the Dutch context. According to him, coercive 
mechanisms include the influence of social partners  (the trade unions  and works  councils), 
labour legislation and government. Mimetic mechanisms refer to imitations of strategies and 
practices  of competitors  as  a  result  of uncertainty,  or  fads  in  the  field  of management 
(benchmarking).  It is  difficult to  determine  whether certain practices  are  the  result of pure 
imitation  or have  their  roots  in  strategy  formulation.  Implementation  of,  e.g.  360-degree 
feedback systems or the HR scorecard may either have a strategic foundation or may simply 
be the a result of imitation. Normative mechanisms refer to the relation between management 
policies  and  the  professional  background  of employees  in  terms  of educational  level,  job 
experience and craftmanship. This mechanism assumes that the degree of professionalisation 
of employees affects the nature of a management control system and its related practices. 
In his empirical research he focuses on coercive and normative mechanisms. He states that 
both  mechanisms  have  an  homogenizing  effect  on  organisations.  High  degrees  of 
institutionalisation differ from low degrees of institutionalisation with respect to the shaping of 
HRM,  but  also  with  respect  to  the  nature  of the  HRM-performance  relationship.  The 
hypothesis that highly institutionalised organisations are more homogeneous with respect to 
works systems than less institutionalised organisations is  accepted. However, the hypothesis 
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that the impact of work systems on performance decreases as  institutionalisation increases is 
not accepted. We think that this  perspective can be useful in  explaining the determinants of 
HRM. Despite the fact that HRM is often seen as a given in studies on the impact of HRM on 
organisational  performance,  this  approach  may  be  useful  in  explaining  the  (lack  of  a) 
consistent relationship between HRM and organisational performance. 
Conclusion: where the story ends  ... or just begins 
Theories,  if accurate,  fulfil  the  objectives of prediction and understanding the  relationships 
among  the  variables  of  interest.  It's  all  about  knowledge  of the  outcome,  to  guide  a 
practitioner's decision making in conditions of uncertainty, and knowledge of the process, to 
test  and  revise  a  model  in  order  to  increase  its  accuracy  (Wright  &  McMahan,  1992). 
Especially in order to test the  accuracy of the aforementioned approaches, empirical studies 
are  very important. The story does thus not end with the theory.  On the contrary, empirical 
work is needed to test, refine and clarify theoretical issues (Guest, 2001). However, it is not 
because the story does not end here, that we cannot conclude on the absence or presence of 
theory in the HRM-performance research. 
The full picture 
The  above  is  the  result  of  a  journey  of  exploration  through  the  (S)HRM-performance 
literature. We discussed the six theoretical models as proposed by Wright & McMahan (1992) 
and extended their framework with other theories in order to get a full  picture. Both internal 
and  external,  strategic  and  non-strategic  determinants  of HRM  got  a  chance.  Both  the 
individual and organisational level of analysis have been discussed. 
In  summary,  we  can conclude that this  research  field  has  a  wide  scope  and integrates 
economical, psychological as well as sociological lines of approach. These are not necessarily 
in  contradiction,  but  are  complementary  in  that  they  all  describe  one  or  more  of (the 
relationships between) the building blocks of the broader theoretical framework visualised in 
Figure 5.  The arrows  reflect  a causal  link  which  flows  from  practices  through  people to 
performance.  The purpose  of this  figure  is  to  give  an  overview  of the  elements  that  are 
covered by theory and to spot possible gaps in theory building. 
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In what follows, we summarise the basics and relevance of the theories and go more deeply 
into  the  performance issue.  The Resource-based  view  of the firm  gives  an  answer  to  the 
question  'When do  human  resources and/or human  resource  management matter (more)?'. 
The work of Wright, McMahan  & McWilliams  (1994) is important in this respect because 
their contribution provides a theoretical discussion of the reason why and the circumstances 
under which  human  resources  can  be  a  source  of sustained competitive advantage.  Other 
authors argue that the HR system can be a source of competitive advantage as well. The RBV 
thus  provides  a  rationale  for  the  reason  why  employees  (labour)  and  human  resource 
management should be considered when  studying or pursueing competitive advantage  and 
firm performance (0). The underlying assumption of human capital theory is that HR practices 
have  a  positive  impact  on  KSAs  (5a)  and  subsequently  on  productivity  (7).  This  theory 
suggest that HRM influences firm performance indirectly and uncovers the underlying HRM-
performance mechanism. The behavioural approach goes more deeply into this mechanism, 
namely by taking the mediating role of employee behaviour into account (6). Firm strategy is 
formulated in answer to strategic business needs such as e.g. management's overall plan for 
survival,  growth  or  profitability  and  is  influenced  by  environmental  factors  such  as 
competition or economic climate (1). According to Becker & Huselid (1998), the behavioural 
perspective is  complemented by the RBV.  The  former focuses  on  how HRM creates firm 
capabilities - i.e. the characteristics (KSAs) and behaviour of the human capital pool (5a and 
6)  -,  the  latter  emphasises  the  attributes  required  so  that  firm  capabilities  can  generate 
competitive advantage  (0).  Both approaches  are  dominantly present in empirical  literature. 
Although  the  above  perspectives  provide  a first  explanation, the  black box remains  partly 
closed because it does not answer the question 'Why do people act the way they do?'. Equity, 
expectancy, social exchange and psychological contract theory lift a comer of the veil  and 
describe  some  of the  cognitive  processes  that  can  influence  decisions  about  workplace 
behaviour (5b and 6).  Agency and transaction cost theorists, in tum, believe that employees 
act expediently, but approach this problem in a more rational way.  They state that one can 
avoid  opportunistic  behaviour  by  designing  an  optimal  contract  and  by using  the  right 
incentives to steer the employee's behaviour in the direction of the organisational goals  (5c 
and 6). 
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In all of the aforementioned perspectives, strategy and organisational goals playa central 
role  (2).  These  approaches  also  assume  that  the  fit  between  organisation  and  individual 
represents  a  quite  attainable  objective.  However,  more  political  oriented  and  institutional 
theorists  argue  that  environmental  and  internal  political  factors  can  play  a  major  role  in 
determining decisions about HRM and that attaining a fit between organisation and individual 
could be  more  difficult  than  expected.  The  political  influence  perspective,  as  well  as  the 
resource dependence model, take political games, power and control into account  (4).  They 
approach HR practices as the outcome of a political 'game'. The more sociologically oriented 
institutional  theory  draws  attention  to  external  factors  restricting  management's  room  for 
manoeuvring or influencing the  decisions concerning HRM (3)  and sees HR  practices  as  a 
product  of imitation,  legislation  and  normative  powers.  We  believe  that  the  political  and 
institutional theories add value to research on the development of HRM in organisations. As 
far  as  studies aiming at measuring the impact of HRM on performance are  concerned, they 
could explain the (lack of a) relationship between HRM and organisational performance. 
Compared  to  the  conceptual  model  of Wright  &  McMahan  (1992;  Figure  1),  this 
framework focuses  more explicitly on the causal chain from employee performance to firm 
performance (Guest, 2001; Guest,  1997; Dyer & Reeves,  1995). Until now,  we  did not pay 
attention to theories on performance and effectiveness. However, being the dependent variable 
in our story, we cannot neglect this issue. What makes some firms excellent and others weak? 
Does  one  have  to  use  objective  or  subjective  measures  of performance?  From  whose 
perspective  - there  are  as  many  definitions  of performance  as  there  are  stakeholders  - is 
performance  being  assessed?  Rather  than  theoretical  problems,  the  issue  of  criteria 
identification  appears  to  be  the  biggest  concern  in  the  field  of assessing  organisational 
effectiveness (Cameron, 1986). A comprehensive overview of the different criteria that can be 
used in HRM-performance research  lies  beyond the  scope  of this  review  article.  We  will 
confine ourself to the level of analysis that has to be chosen. Performance can be assessed on 
an  individual,  group,  organisational,  sector  or country  level.  In  our  framework  both  the 
individual  and  organisational  level  are  important.  Based upon  the  work  of other  authors 
(Guest, 2001; Rogers & Wright, 1998; Becker & al., 1997; Dyer & Reeves, 1995) we believe 
that  outcomes  can  be  differentiated  at  hierarchical  levels,  with  outcomes  at  one  level 
contributing (along with  other factors)  to  outcomes  at the next level.  Although  the  models 
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found in literature differ in the number of levels and the exact outcomes, a generic form of the 
model is that HR practices have their most direct impact on employee behaviour/performance 
(6)  and  subsequently  to  what  we  call  •  operational'  performance  (7).  This  operational 
performance, in turn, contributes to higher level organisational performance constructs, such 
as financial accounting performance (8) and market performance (9). 
No  theory?  Old  theory?  Good  theory,  bad  research?  We  already  mentioned  in  the 
introduction  that theories have  been  developed in three main  areas  concerning  HRM and 
performance: (1) performance measures to be used, (2) HR practices and measures appropriate 
to study the link with performance and (3) the nature of the linkage between the two variables 
(Truss, 2001). It  was our purpose to go thoroughly through the perspectives that have been put 
forward in order to explain and understand the link between the two variables. As far as this 
area is concerned, we conclude that it does not suffer from a lack of theories. On the contrary, 
the existing theories include economical, sociological as  well as  psychological perspectives 
and all  together they  shed  some  light  on  how  HRM might  be  determined  and  how  the 
mechanisms within the black box might work. Moreover, conditions are proposed under which 
HRM can lead to higher performance. Despite this rich reservoir of theories and the pile of 
empirical articles that try to  'peel back the onion' (cf. Becker & al., 1997), both theorists and 
empiricists have the feeling that 'there is still a lot of work to do. They are struggling with 
some  major problems.  These  problems  are,  in  our opinion,  due  to  three  factors:  (1)  the 
difficulties the (combination of) aforementioned theories impose on empirical research, (2) a 
lack of theory  building in  the  field  of HRM and  performance  measurement  and  (3)  the 
constant theoretical reorientation because of the ever returning criticism. With regard to the 
first and the second point, we rely on the major gaps that are often cited in empirical research: 
(1) the level(s) of analysis (individual,  group and/or organisational level), (2) the lack of a 
construct  of performance,  (3)  difficulties  with  performance  criteria  identification,  (3)  no 
consensus  with  regard  to  the  practices  that  are  part  of HPWS,  (4)  no  uniformity  in 
measurement of HRM systems (level of analysis in the HRM architecture), (5) no uniformity 
in performance measurement and (6) the problem of reversed causality (isn't it the other way 
round?). Finally, because the need for theory building is being constantly repeated, a process 
of theoretical reorientation is started off. This constant theoretical reorientation can hinder the 
empirical process to develop and to explore the existing theories fully. 
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i In the sense that the level of analysis is the firm and not the individual 
ii According  to  Daft (1983)  and  Barney (1991), firm  resources  include  all  assets,  capabilities,  organisational 
processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of 
and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. 
iii  Physical capital resources include the physical technology used in a firm,  a firm's plant and equipment, its 
geographic location and its  access to raw materials.  Human capital resources include the training, experience, 
judgement, intelligence, relationships, and insight of individual managers and workers in a firm.  Organisational 
capital resources include a firm's formal reporting structure, its  formal  and informal planning, controlling, and 
coordinating systems, as well as informal relations among groups within a firm and between a firm and those in 
its environment (Barney, 1991). 
iv  (Porter, 1980) In accordance with broader organisational strategy and implying needed role behaviour. 
v  Central  to  an  innovation  strategy  is  the  issue  of developing  products  or  services  different  from  those  of 
competitors. The primary focus is on offering something new and different (Porter, 1980, 1985). 
vi (Porter, 1980) In accordance with broader organisational strategy and implying needed role behaviour. 
vii  Motivation refers to forces within an individual that account for the level, direction and persistence of effort 
expended at work. Organisational commitment refers to the degree to which a person strongly identifies with and 
feels part of the organisation. Job involvement is the willingness of a person to work hard and apply effort beyond 
normal job expectations. Job satisfaction can be  defined as  the degree to  which individuals feel  positively or 
negatively about their jobs. It is an attitude or emotional response to  work tasks as  well as to  the physical and 
social conditions of the workplace (Schermerhorn & aI., 1998). 
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